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1 Introduction
Optimal growth theory is useful in qualitatively characterizing simple dynami-
cal systems and in providing constructive methods for the quantitative analysis
of the solutions to more complex ones. The usefulness is, for some purposes,
enhanced because of the intimate connections between optimal growth theories
and their equilibrium counterparts. In a decentralized economy, we seek knowl-
edge about the time paths of the various prices for goods and production factors
as well as the distribution of income and wealth. Dynamic optimization tech-
niques used extensively in growth theory facilitate the study of the evolution of
those economic aggregates.
A major concern in the area of optimal growth has been the analysis of the
short-run and asymptotic behavior of optimal solutions. At issue are questions
concerning the existence and asymptotic stability of optimal programs with re-
spect to the stationary optimal stock (turnpike results) as well as the possibility
of cyclical or even chaotic behavior.
One-sector representative agent models where utility is derived solely from
consumption have been studied extensively in the literature under a variety of
diﬀerent technological specifications. A well known property of those models is
the monotonicity of the optimal capital path. This property is persistent even
when the technology exhibits increasing returns and investment is irreversible
(see Dechert and Nishimura (1983), Dimaria, Le Van and Morhaim (2002),
Duran and Le Van (2003)). Thus, it is often suggested that one-sector models
display simple dynamics.
Becker and Foias (1987) show that agents’ heterogeneity plays a crucial role
to the appearance of nonmonotonic dynamics in a single-sector model. Study-
ing a specific economy with incomplete markets as represented by borrowing
constraints, they demonstrate that deterministic cycles of period 2 may occur.
In Becker and Foias (1994), they discuss in more detail the issue of equilibrium
cycles and their construction using bifurcation analysis. Their work has been
further elaborated by Sorger (1994).
In a diﬀerent setting (i.e complete market structure), Le Van and Vailakis
(2003) have also shown that the monotonicity property does not carry over
if one permits many consumers with diﬀerent discount factors. The model
does not exhibit cyclical behavior. The convergence of the optimal capital
sequence to a particular stock ks is still true, but that stock is not itself a
steady state1. This result implies that the optimal capital sequence initiated
at k0 = ks converges to ks in the long-run, but it is not a constant sequence.
Hence, the resulting optimal capital path cannot be monotonic. The model
1An early turnpike result for multisector economies with heterogeneous agents has been
proved by Coles (1985).
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exhibits the twisted turnpike property (see Mitra (1979), Becker (2005)): the
optimal capital accumulation paths starting from diﬀerent initial capital stocks
converge to each other or come together in the limit, but this limit is not
itself an optimal stationary program. This is a fundamental property of the
heterogeneous agent model and it shows one way in which this model diﬀers
significantly from its representative agent counterpart.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and under which conditions
similar properties hold when the model studied in Le Van and Vailakis (2003)
is extended to include an endogenous non-reproducible factor such as labor.
The analysis in Le Van and Vailakis (2003) is carried out by exploiting the
so called reduced form model associated with the welfare maximization prob-
lem. The presence of heterogeneous discount factors turns out the reduced-form
problem to be nonstationary, making the issue of convergence of optimal paths
a nontrivial one. Their argument exploits the fact that the indirect utility func-
tion Vt associated with the reduced form model is C2 in the interior of a set
describing the feasible activities in period t. This allows them to use the diﬀer-
entiable characterization of supermodularity to show that Vt is supermodular.
The supermodularity of Vt then implies that the stationary problem involving
the agents with a discount factor equal to the maximum one, has a unique
stable steady state ks. Exploiting additional properties of optimal paths, they
subsequently show that the optimal capital sequence associated with the initial
problem involving all agents converges to ks.
Several complications arise by applying a similar method of proof in the
presence of elastic labor supply. The problems arise largely from the fact that
we cannot exclude the existence of corner solutions in the welfare maximization
problem2. More precisely, we cannot ensure that all consumers supply labor at
any period. As a consequence, the indirect utility function Vt associated with the
reduced form model is not necessarily C2 in the interior of the set that describes
feasible activities. Hence, one cannot use the diﬀerentiable characterization of
supermodilarity to prove that Vt is supermodular. To overcome the problem
and establish the supermodularity of Vt, we employ an alternative argument
based on a iterative procedure in which a sequence of functions, (V nt )n, are
shown to be supermodular and to be converging to the function Vt.
Other issues are associated with the properties of optimal paths. Several
proofs in Le Van and Vailakis (2003) do not apply in the presence of elastic
labor supply. New and general arguments are given to establish the validity of
those properties.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section 3
2Similar problems arise in incomplete market models (see Becker and Foias (1987) and
more recently Datta et al. (2005)).
3
we present its reduced-form counterpart and establish some preliminary results.
Section 4 deals with the dynamic equilibrium properties of optimal paths.
2 The model
We consider an intertemporal one-sector model with m ≥ 1 consumers and one
firm. At each period, individuals consume a quantity ci,t and decide how to
divide the available time, normalized at 1, between leisure activities li,t, and
work Li,t. Preferences are represented by a functional that takes the usual
additively separable form:
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t),
where ui denotes the instantaneous utility function and βi ∈ (0, 1) is the dis-
count factor.
The initial endowment of capital, the single reproducible factor in the econ-
omy, is denoted by k0 ≥ 0. Technology is described by a gross production
function F . Capital evolves according to:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It,
where It is gross investment and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation for capital.
At each period, the economy’s resource constraints, restricting the allocation
of income and time, are:
mX
i=1
ci,t + It ≤ F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt,
mX
i=1
Li,t = Lt.
We next specify a set of restrictions imposed on preferences and production
technology. The assumptions on period utility function ui : R2+ → R are as
follows:
Assumption U1: ui is continuous, strictly concave, increasing on R2+ and
strictly increasing on R2++.
Assumption U2: ui(0, 0) = 0.
Assumption U3: ui is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on R2++ with partial
derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions: limc→0 uic(c, l) = +∞, ∀l > 0 and
liml→0 uil(c, l) = +∞, ∀c > 0.
Assumption U4: For all c > 0 and l > 0, the cross partial derivative uicl has
a constant sign. In addition, we require the first and second partial derivatives
to verify the following condition:
uicc
uic
≤ u
i
cl
uil
.
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Remark 1 Assuming that uccuc ≤
ucl
ul
in U4 implies that leisure is a normal
good. When ucl ≥ 0, the condition is trivially satisfied. In case where ucl < 0,
it restricts in magnitude. The condition is satisfied for the class of homothetic
preferences, u(c, l) = m[h(c, l)], where h is a homogeneous function of degree 1
and m is a monotone increasing transformation. Examples of period utilities
with ucl < 0 that verify this condition include the family of functional forms,
u(c, l) = 11−σ [c
αU(l)]1−σ, where σ > 1, α ∈ (0, 1) and U is a concave function.
The assumptions on the production function F : R2+ → R+ are as follows:
Assumption F1: F is continuous, concave, increasing on R2+ and strictly
increasing on R2++.
Assumption F2: F (0, 0) = 0.
Assumption F3: F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on R2++ with partial
derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions: limk→0 Fk(k, 1) = +∞, limk→+∞
Fk(k,m) = 0 and limL→0 FL(k, L) = +∞, ∀k > 0.
Assumption F4: For all k > 0 and L > 0, FkL ≥ 0 and Fkk < 0.
We conclude this section by introducing some notation.
Let f(kt, Lt) = F (kt, Lt) + (1− δ)kt. Under the previous assumptions we have:
limk→0 fk(k, 1) = +∞, limk→+∞ fk(k,m) < 1 and limL→0 fL(k, L) = +∞.
Consider the set of feasible capital sequences:
Π(k0) = {k ∈ (R+)∞: 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t} .
Let ci = (ci,t)t≥0, li = (li,t)t≥0 and Li = (Li,t)t≥0 denote consumer’s i con-
sumption, leisure-work intertemporal allocation. The vector of nonnegative se-
quences (ci, li,Li)
m
i=1 is said to be feasible from k0 ≥ 0, if there exists a sequence
k ∈ Π(k0), such that for any t, ((ci,t, li,t, Li,t)mi=1, kt) satisfies the economy’s re-
source constraints together with the individual constraints li,t+Li,t ≤ 1. The set
of feasible from k0 consumption, leisure-labor allocations is denoted by Σ(k0).
3 Planner’s Problem
The planner’s welfare function is taken to be a weighted function of the un-
derlying households’ intertemporal functions. Let ∆ =
½
λ ∈ Rm+ |
mP
i=1
λi = 1
¾
.
Given a vector of welfare weights λ ∈ ∆ the social planner maximizes:
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max
mX
i=1
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t) (P )
s.t.
mX
i=1
ci,t + kt+1 ≤ f(kt,
mX
i=1
Li,t),∀t
ci,t ≥ 0, li,t ≥ 0, Li,t ≥ 0, li,t + Li,t ≤ 1, ∀i,∀t
kt ≥ 0, ∀t and k0 given.
It is well known that any Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be represented as the
solution to problem (P ). In other words, by varying the welfare weights it is
possible to trace the economy’s utility possibility frontier. This procedure can
also be used to prove the existence of a price system that supports Pareto-
optima and characterize competitive equilibria as a set of welfare weights such
that the associated transfer payments are zero (Negishi approach).
3.1 Preliminary results
Since ui and F are assumed to be strictly increasing, (Li)mi=1 can be dropped
from the list of planner’s choices. Consider the technology set D:
D :=
©
(k, y) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)
ª
and define the correspondence Γ :
(k, y) ∈ D →
(
(ci, li)
m
i=1 :
mX
i=1
ci + y ≤ f(k,
mX
i=1
(1− li)), ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i
)
.
Given λ ∈ ∆, let I = {i | λi > 0}, β = max{βi | i ∈ I}, I1 = {i ∈ I | βi = β}
and I2 = {i ∈ I | βi < β}.
Remark 2 Let ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) denote a solution to problem (P ). It is easy to
show that if λi = 0 for some i, then c∗i,t = 0 and l
∗
i,t = 0 for any t ≥ 0.
Denote ζ := (ζi)i∈I2 ∈ [0, 1]#I2 . Consider the function V : ∆×[0, 1]#I2×D→
R+ :
V (λ, ζ, k, y) = max
⎡
⎣X
i∈I1
λiu
i(ci, li) +
X
i∈I2
λiζiu
i(ci, li)
⎤
⎦
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I.
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Let
(ci(λ, ζ, k, y), li(λ, ζ, k, y))i∈I = argmax
(X
i∈I
λiζiu
i(ci, li) : (ci, li)i∈I ∈ Γ(k, y)
)
.
For any t ≥ 0, for any ζ ∈ [0, 1]#I2 , we use the notation ζt = (ζti)i∈I2 . Fix
ζ =
³
βi
β
´
i∈I2
. In this case, for any t, we denote:
Vt(λ, ζ, k, y) := V (λ, ζ
t, k, y)
= max
⎡
⎣X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li) +
X
i∈I2
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)
⎤
⎦ (S)
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I.
Consider subsequently the following intertemporal problem:
max
∞X
t=0
βtVt(λ, ζ, kt, kt+1) (Q)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
The following proposition shows that problems (P ) and (Q) are equivalent.
More precisely we have:
Proposition 1 Let k0 ≥ 0 be given. Under assumptions U1, F1:
i) If ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) is a solution to problem (P ), then k∗ is a solution to
problem (Q).
ii) If k∗ is a solution to problem (Q), then there exists (c∗i , l
∗
i )i such that
((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) is a solution to problem (P ).
Proof : It is easy.
The next step is to study the properties of function Vt. Working in this
direction we need the following result.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions U1-U2, F1-F2:
i) If F (0, L) > 0, then Γ is continuous at any (k, y) ∈ D
ii) If F (0, L) = 0, then Γ is upper hemicontinuous at (0, 0) and continuous
at any (k, y) ∈ D with k > 0.
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Proof : i) Let (kn, yn) ∈ D be a sequence that converges to some (k, y) ∈ D.
Let also (cni , l
n
i )i be a sequence such that (c
n
i , l
n
i )i ∈ Γ(kn, yn), ∀n ∈ N. Since
lni ∈ [0, 1], cni ≤ f(kn,m) and kn → k, there exists a subsequence (cni , lni )i that
converges to some (ci, li)i. Since
Pm
i=1 c
n
i +y
n ≤ f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− lni )) , it follows
that (ci, li)i ∈ Γ(k, y).
We next show that Γ is lower hemicontinuous at any (k, y) ∈ D.
Let (kn, yn) ∈ D be a sequence that converges to some (k, y) ∈ D. Take (ci, li)i ∈
Γ(k, y).We will show that there exists N ≥ 1 and a sequence (cni , lni )i such that
(cni , l
n
i )i ∈ Γ(kn, yn), ∀n ≥ N and (cni , lni )i → (ci, li)i. We consider three cases:
Case 1:
Pm
i=1 ci + y < f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) .
Observe that for n large enough,
Pm
i=1 ci + y
n < f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) . In this
case, let cni = ci and l
n
i = li.
Case 2:
Pm
i=1 ci + y = f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) and
Pm
i=1 ci > 0.
Denote by I
0
the set of agents such that ci > 0. In this case there exists N
such that yn < f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) , ∀n ≥ N. Let ξ = f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) − y
and ξn = f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li))− yn, ∀n ≥ N. Since ξn → ξ, for N large enough,
it folows that ci+
ξn−ξ
#I0
> 0, ∀n ≥ N. For any n ≥ N, let cni = ci+
ξn−ξ
#I0
if i ∈ I 0 ,
cni = 0 if i /∈ I
0
and lni = li for any i.
Case 3:
Pm
i=1 ci + y = f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) and ci = 0, ∀i.
We have y = f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) . We consider three subcases.
a) Assume that li = 0, ∀i.
In this case, y = f(k,m). Let cnj = f(k
n,m)−yn for some j, cni = 0, ∀i 6= j and
lni = 0, ∀i.
b) Assume that there exists a subset of agents, denoted I 0, such that li ∈
(0, 1) for any i ∈ I 0.
In this case, y = f (k,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) < f(k,m). Assume first that there exists a
subsequence (kn, yn) such that yn ≤ f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) . In this case, let cnj =
f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li))−yn for some j, cni = 0 for i 6= j and lni = li, ∀i. Assume next
that there exists a subsequence (kn, yn) such that yn > f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li)) .
Choose some agent j ∈ I 0. Define the decreasing functions ψj : [0, 1] → R and
ψnj : [0, 1]→ R for n ∈ N as follows:
ψj(ξ) = f(k, (1− ξ) +m− 1−
X
i6=j
li)− y
ψnj (ξ) = f(k
n, (1− ξ) +m− 1−
X
i6=j
li)− yn.
Note that ψj(lj) = 0. Observe that there exists N large enough such that
ψn(0) > 0, ∀n ≥ N. Moreover, ψnj (lj) = f (kn,
Pm
i=1(1− li))− yn < 0, ∀n ≥ N.
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists ξn ∈ (0, lj) such that ψnj (ξn) =
0. For any n ≥ N, let lnj = ξn, lni = li, ∀i 6= j and cni = 0, ∀i.
c) Assume that li = 1, ∀i.
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In this case, y = f(k, 0). Assume first that there exits a subsequence (kn, yn)
such that yn ≤ f(kn, 0). In this case, let cnj = f(kn, 0)− yn for some j, cni = 0,
∀i 6= j and lni = 1, ∀i. Assume next that there exists a subsequence (kn, yn)
such that yn > f(kn, 0). Fix some agent j ∈ {1, ...m}. Define the decreasing
functions ψj : [0, 1]→ R and ψnj : [0, 1]→ R for n ∈ N :
ψj(ξ) = f (k, (1− ξ))− y
ψnj (ξ) = f (k
n, (1− ξ))− yn.
Note that ψj(1) = 0. Observe that there exists N large enough such that
ψnj (0) > 0, ∀n ≥ N. Moreover, ψnj (1) = f(kn, 0) − yn < 0, ∀n ≥ N. By the
Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists ξn ∈ (0, 1) such that ψnj (ξn) = 0. For
any n ≥ N, let lnj = ξn, lni = 1, ∀i 6= j and cni = 0, ∀i.
ii) The continuity of Γ at any (k, y) ∈ D with k > 0 follows in a similar way
as in claim (i). To see why the lower hemicontinuity of Γ fails at (0, 0) when
F (0, L) = 0, observe that in this case D = {(0, 0)} and
Γ(0, 0) = {(ci, li)i : ci = 0 and li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i}.
Choose (ci, li)i ∈ Γ(0, 0) such that ci = 0 and li > 0 for some i. Consider next a
sequence (kn, yn) such that yn = f(kn,m) and (kn, yn)→ (0, 0). Note that there
is no sequence (cni , l
n
i )i such that (c
n
i , l
n
i )i ∈ Γ(kn, yn) and (cni , lni )i → (ci, li)i.
Proposition 2 Assume U1-U3 and F1-F3. Then,
i) The function V : ∆ × [0, 1]#I2 ×D → R+ is increasing in k, decreasing
in y and strictly concave in (k, y).
ii) The function V is upper semicontinuous on [0, 1]#I2 ×D and continuous
at any (ζ, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×D with k > 0.
iii) The functions ci : ∆×[0, 1]#I2×D → R+ and li : ∆×[0, 1]#I2×D→ [0, 1]
are continuous at any (ζ, k, y) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × intD.
iv) Let (k, y) ∈ D be such that 0 ≤ y < f(k,m). If (c∗i , l∗i )i∈I is a solution
to the static maximization problem (S), then, c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i > 0 for any i ∈ I.
v) Vt is diﬀerentiable at any (k, y) ∈ intD with partial derivatives given by:
∂Vt(λ, ζ, k, y)
∂k
= µtfk(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )
∂Vt(λ, ζ, k, y)
∂y
= −µt
where µt = λi
³
βi
β
´t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i ), ∀i ∈ I.
Proof : The proof of (i) follows from standard arguments. Claims (ii) and (iii)
follow from the Maximum Theorem.
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(iv) Since 0 ≤ y < f(k,m), there exists ε > 0 such that 0 < y + ε <
f(k,m − ε). Letting ci = ε#I and li =
ε
#I , ∀i ∈ I, the Slater condition is
satisfied. Hence, there exist Lagrange multipliers µt(λ, ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R+ associated
with the constraint
P
i ci + y ≤ f(k,m −
P
i∈I li) and ηi,t(λ, ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R+
associated with the constraints li ≤ 1 such that ((c∗i )i∈I , (l∗i )i∈I , µt, (ηi,t)i∈I)
maximizes the associated Lagrangian :
L =
X
i∈I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)− µt
"X
i∈I
ci + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
li)
#
−
X
i∈I
ηi,t(li − 1).
The fact that c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i > 0, ∀i ∈ I is a consequence of the Inada conditions
imposed on period utilities.
Claim (v) follows from a direct application of Corollary 7.3.1 in Florenzano,
Le Van and Gourdel (2001).
Since fk(∞,m) < 1, there exists some k such that f(k,m) = k. It is easy to
show that k ∈ Π(k0) implies that kt ≤ A(k0) = max{k0, k} for all t. This in turn
implies that Π(k0) is included in a compact set for the product topology. Since
f is continuous, the set Π(k0) is closed for the product topology, and therefore
is compact in this topology. Define the function U : R+ ×Π(k0)→ R+ :
U(k0,k) =
∞X
t=0
βtVt(λ, kt, kt+1).
We have the following result.
Lemma 2 i) The correspondence Π is continuous for the product topology.
ii) U(k0, ·) is upper semicontinuous on Π(k0) for the product topology.
Proof : Refer to Le Van and Morhaim (2002, Lemma 2, Proposition 2).
It follows that problem (Q) is equivalent to the maximization of an upper
semicontinuous function over a compact set, and therefore it admits a solution.
Observe also that the strict concavity of Vt implies that the solution is unique.
Proposition 3 For all k0 ≥ 0, there is a unique optimal accumulation path.
3.2 Value function-Bellman equation-Optimal policy
One way to make any further analysis easier is to work with the value function.
Let ζ = (ζi)i∈I2 ∈ [0, 1]#I2 . Given T ≥ 0, define the function WT : (ζ, k0) ∈
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[0, 1]#I2 ×R+ → R+ :
WT (ζ, k0) := W (ζ
T , k0)
= max
∞X
t=0
βtVt(λ, ζT , kt, kt+1)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
It is obvious that when ζ =
³
βi
β
´
i∈I2
, W0(ζ, k0) is the value function associ-
ated with problem (Q). In infinite-horizon problems with time-invariant period
return functions (stationary problems) the value function is a function of the
initial state alone. In the above problem the period return function is time-
dependent, so the problem is a nonstationary one. In this case, as the time
index on W indicates, the value function is also time dependent.
Proposition 4 The function WT : (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × R+ → R+ is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in k, nonnegative with W (ζ, k) > 0 for k > 0,
and continuous at any (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×R+.
Proof : It follows from standard arguments.
The next proposition states formally what is known as the Principle of
Optimality. It will help us characterize basic properties of optimal paths.
Proposition 5 The value function solves the Bellman equation, i.e
∀t,∀k, Wt(ζ, k) = max{Vt(λ, ζ, k, y) + βWt+1(ζ, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)}
and for all k0 ≥ 0, a feasible path k is optimal, if and only if,
Wt(ζ, kt) = Vt(λ, ζ, kt, kt+1) + βWt+1(ζ, kt+1)
holds for all t.
We next define the function ϕT : (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×R+ → R+ :
ϕT (ζ, k) := ϕ(ζ
T , k) = argmax
©
V (λ, ζT , k, y) + βW (ζT+1, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)
ª
.
When ζ =
³
βi
β
´
i∈I2
, it follows that for any T ≥ 0, for any kT :
k∗T+t = ϕ(ζ
T+t−1, k∗T+t−1)
= ϕ(ζT+t−1, ϕ(ζT+t−2, k∗T+t−2))
= ϕ(ζT+t−1, ϕ(ζT+t−2, ..., ϕ(ζT , kT )...))
for t ≥ 1. For simplicity we write k∗T+t = ϕt(ζT , kT ).
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Proposition 6 The function ϕ is continuous at any (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × R+,
and therefore uniformly continuous at any (ζ, k) ∈ [0, 1]#I2 × [0, A(k0)].
Proof : Assume first that F satisfies F (0, L) > 0. The result follows from the
Maximum Theorem. Assume next that F satisfies F (0, L) = 0. If k > 0, the
continuity of ϕ follows from the Maximum Theorem. When k = 0, feasibility
implies that ϕ(ζ, k) = 0. Let (ζn, kn)n ∈ [0, 1]#I2 ×R+ be a sequence such that
0 ≤ ϕ(ζn, kn) ≤ f(kn,m) and kn → 0. Since f(0,m) = 0, it follows that the
sequence of maximizers converges to 0 as n→ +∞.
Consider next the planner’s problem involving only the agents having a
discount factor equal to the maximum one. Let 0e := (0)i∈I2 denote the zero
vector in R#I2 . Define the time invariant function bV : ∆×D → R+:
bV (λ, k, y) := V (λ, 0e, k, y)
= max
X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li) ( bP )
s.t.
X
i∈I1
ci + y ≤ f(k,m−
X
i∈I1
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I1.
The intertemporal problem associated with the indirect utility bV is now sta-
tionary:
cW (k0) := W (0e, k0)
= max
∞X
t=0
βt bV (λ, kt, kt+1) ( bQ)
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f(kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0, is given.
The optimal policy function for this problem is given by:
ϕ(0e, k) = argmax
nbV (λ, k, y) + βcW (y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ f(k,m)o .
If k∗ is the optimal solution to problem ( bQ), then obviously k∗t = ϕ(0e, k∗t−1) =
ϕt(0e, k0).
Let k0 ≥ 0. It is easy to check that for any feasible allocation ((ci, li)i,k)
from k0, we have:
ui(ci,t, li,t) ≤ ui(f(A(k0),m), 1) = B(k0), ∀i.
This in turn implies that for any t, for any (k, y) ∈ D :
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bV (λ, k, y) ≤ Vt(λ, ζ, k, y) ≤
⎛
⎝
max
i∈I2
βi
β
⎞
⎠
t
C(k0) + bV (λ, k, y),
where C(k0) =
P
i∈I2
B(k0). Let ε > 0. Since
µmax
i∈I2
βi
β
¶
< 1, there exists T
independent of k0 such that for any t:
bV (λ, k, y) ≤ VT+t(λ, ζ, k, y) ≤ εC(k0) + bV (λ, k, y).
It follows that for any k0 ≥ 0, for any T
0 ≥ T :
cW (k0) ≤WT 0(ζ, k0) ≤ εC(k0) 1
1− β +
cW (k0).
Observe that for any sequence (kt)∞t=0 feasible from k0, we have C(kt) ≤ C(k0).
Hence, the following inequalities hold:
bV (λ, kt, kt+1) ≤ Vt(λ, ζ, kt, kt+1) ≤ εC(k0) + bV (λ, kt, kt+1), ∀t ≥ T,
cW (kt) ≤Wt(ζ, kt) ≤ εC(k0) 1
1− β +
cW (kt), ∀t ≥ T.
Consider a feasible capital sequence (kt)∞t=0 starting from some k0 ≥ 0. Using
the previous results, for any subsequence (tn)∞n=1 such that ktn → k ≥ 0 and
ktn+1 → k0 ≥ 0, we have:
lim
n→∞
Vtn(λ, ζ, ktn , ktn+1) = bV (λ, k, k0) and limn→∞Wtn(ζ, ktn) = cW (k).
4 Dynamic Equilibrium Properties
It is mentioned in the introduction that when labor is elastic one cannot exclude
the existence of corner solutions in the welfare maximization problem. The
presence of corner solution is related to the possibility of having consumers not
supplying labor in some periods. It is a direct consequence that in this case the
indirect utility function Vt is not necessarily C2 in the interior of D. As a result
one cannot use the diﬀerentiable characterization of supermodularity to prove
that the indirect utility function Vt is supermodular. To prove the validity of this
property in our setting we employ an alternative argument based on a iterative
procedure in which a sequence of functions are shown to be supermodular and to
be converging to the function Vt. In what follows we deal with the construction
of such a sequence.
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Let α ∈ (0, 1) and ν ∈ (0, 1]. Consider the production function ef defined as
follows: ef (ν, k, (1− li)i) := f(k,m− mX
i=1
li) + ν
mX
i=1
(1− li)α
Observe that limli→1 efLi (ν, k, (1− li)i) = +∞. Denote ef(ν, k,m) := f (k,m) +
νm. Let eD be the technology set:
eD := n(k, y) ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ y ≤ ef(ν, k,m)o ,
and define the correspondence eΓ :
(ν, k, y) ∈ (0, 1]× eD→ {(ci, li)i : mX
i=1
ci + y ≤ ef (ν, k, (1− li)i) , ci ≥ 0,
li ∈ [0, 1],∀i}.
Lemma 3 Under AssumptionsU1-U2, F1-F2, eΓ continuous at any (ν, k, y) ∈
(0, 1]× eD.
Proof : Observe that ef (ν, 0, (1− li)i) > 0 for any ν ∈ (0, 1]. The proof is
similar to the one used to prove Lemma 1(i).
Given any ν ∈ (0, 1] denote by (P (ν)) the Pareto optimal problem (analo-
gous to problem (P )) associated with an economy with production possibilities
described by the function ef. Let ((c∗i (ν), l∗i (ν))i,k∗(ν)) denote a solution to
problem (P (ν)). It is easy to show that λi = 0 for some i implies c∗i,t(ν) = 0
and l∗i,t(ν) = 0 for any t. Denote:
ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I) := f(k,m−X
i∈I
li) + ν
X
i∈I
(1− li)α + ν(m−#I)
Let ζ =
³
βi
β
´
i∈I2
. In this case,
eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y) := eV (ν, λ, ζt, k, y)
= max
⎡
⎣X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li) +
X
i∈I2
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)
⎤
⎦(S(ν))
s.t.
X
i∈I
ci + y ≤ ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I.
is the indirect utility function associated with Problem (P (ν)). In a similar way,
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for any T ≥ 0, let :
fWT (ν, ζ, k0) := fW (ν, ζT , k0)
= max
∞X
t=0
βt eV (ν, λ, ζT+t, kt, kt+1) (Q(ν))
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ ef(ν, kt,m), ∀t
k0 ≥ 0 is given.
be the value function associated with the indirect utility eVt. Finally, let
eϕT (ν, ζ, k) := eϕ(ν, ζT , k)
= argmax
neV (ν, λ, ζT , k, y) + βfW (ζT+1, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ ef(ν, k,m)o
denote the policy function associated with problem Q(ν).We have the following
results.
Proposition 7 Assume U1-U4 and F1-F4. Then,
i) The function eVt is strictly concave in (k, y) and continuous at any (ν, k, y) ∈
(0, 1]× eD. Moreover,
lim
ν→0
eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y) = Vt(λ, ζ, k, y).
ii) Let ν ∈ (0, 1] and (k, y) ∈ eD such that 0 ≤ y < ef (ν, k,m) . If (c∗i , l∗i )i∈I is
a solution to the static maximization problem (S(ν)), then c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i ∈ (0, 1)
for any i ∈ I.
iii) For any (ν, k, y) ∈ (0, 1]× int eD :
∂ eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y)
∂k∂y
> 0.
That is, for any ν ∈ (0, 1], eVt is supermodular in the interior of eD.
iv) For any T ≥ 0, the value function fWT (ν, ζ, k) is strictly increasing,
strictly concave in k, nonnegative withWT (ν, ζ, k) > 0 for k > 0 and continuous
at any (ν, k) ∈ (0, 1]×R+. Moreover,
lim
ν→0
fWT (ν, ζ, k) =WT (ζ, k).
v) The function eϕ is continuous at any (ν, k) ∈ [0, 1] × R+ and therefore
uniformly continuous at any (ν, k) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, A(k0)]. Moreover,
lim
ν→0
eϕT (ν, ζ, k) = ϕT (ζ, k).
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Proof : The strict concavity of eVt is standard. Continuity follows from the
Maximum Theorem. The proof of claim (ii) is given below. To prove claim (iii)
we need the following two results.
Claim 1 Let
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 + b b · · · b b
b a2 + b · · · · · · b
· · · · · · ... . . . · · · ...
b b · · · aq−1 + b b
b b · · · b aq + b
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
with b < 0, ai < 0, ∀i = 1, ..., q.Then V −1 is negative definite and V −11 < 0.
Proof: It is easy to show that V is negative definite. Hence, V −1 exists and it
is negative definite. Let x =V −11. Since V x = 1, it follows that
aixi + b
qX
i=1
xi = 1, ∀i.
This in turn implies that x1 = aia1xi, ∀i 6= 1. If x1 ≥ 0, then xi ≥ 0, ∀i 6= 1 while
aixi + b
Pq
i=1 xi ≤ 0: a contradiction. Hence, xi < 0, ∀i = 1, ..., q.
Claim 2 Let A be a N ×N symmetric matrix. Given r = 1, ..., N, denote by
rA the r×N submatrix where only the r rows are retained and by rAr the r×r
submatrix where only the first r ≤ N rows and r ≤ N columns are retained.
Let B be an N × S submatrix with S ≤ N and rank equal to S. A is negative
definite on {z ∈ RN : Bz = 0} (i.e zTAz < 0, ∀z ∈ RN with Bz = 0 and z 6= 0)
if and only if
(−1)r
¯¯¯¯
¯ rAr rB(rB)T 0
¯¯¯¯
¯ > 0
for r = S + 1, ..., N.
Proof: See Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Theorem M.D.3.
(ii) Let (c∗i )i∈I = (ci(ν, λ, ζ
t, k, y))i∈I , (l∗i )i∈I = (li(ν, λ, ζ
t, k, y))i∈I denote a
solution to the maximization problem S(ν). Since (k, y) ∈ eD with 0 ≤ y <ef (ν, k,m) , there exists ε > 0 such that 0 < ε + y < f(k,m − ε) + ν(#I)(1 −
ε
#I )
α+ ν(m−#I). Letting ci = ε#I and li =
ε
#I , ∀i ∈ I, the Slater condition is
satisfied. Hence, there exists Lagrange multipliers µt(ν, λ, ζ
t, k, y) ∈ R associ-
ated with the constraint
P
i ci+y ≤ ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I) and ηi,t(ν, λ, ζt, k, y) ∈ R
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associated with the constraints li ≤ 1 such that ((c∗i )i∈I , (l∗i )i∈I , µt, (ηi,t)i∈I)
maximizes the associated Lagrangian :
L =
X
i∈I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
ui(ci, li)−µt
"X
i∈I
ci + y − ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I)
#
−
X
i∈I
ηi,t(li−1).
From the The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions we get:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt = 0,∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt
⎡
⎣fL(k,m−
X
j∈I
l∗j ) + να(1− l∗i )α−1
⎤
⎦− ηi,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I
µt ≥ 0, µt
"X
i∈I
c∗i + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )− ν
X
i∈I
(1− l∗i )α − ν(m−#I)
#
= 0
ηi,t ≥ 0, ηi,t(l∗i − 1) = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
Since ui is strictly increasing, ui(0, 0) = 0 and ui satisfies the Inada conditions,
it follows that c∗i > 0 and l
∗
i > 0, ∀i ∈ I. Therefore, µt > 0. Moreover, we have
that l∗i < 1 and ηi,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I. The first-order conditions become:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt = 0, ∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )− µt
⎡
⎣fL(k,m−
X
j∈I
l∗j ) + να(1− l∗i )α−1
⎤
⎦ = 0, ∀i ∈ I
X
i∈I
c∗i + y − f(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )− ν
X
i∈I
(1− l∗i )α − ν(m−#I) = 0
Diﬀerentiating the above equations and rearranging we get:
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uiccdc
∗
i + λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicldl
∗
i − dµt = 0, ∀i ∈ I
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicldc
∗
i +
"
λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uill − µt
να(1− α)
(1− l∗i )2−α
+ µtfLL
#
dl∗i
+µtfLL
X
j∈I,j 6=i
dl∗j −
∙
fL +
να
(1− l∗i )1−α
¸
dµt = µtfkLdk, ∀i ∈ I
X
i∈I
dc∗i + dy − fkdk + fL
X
i∈I
dl∗i +
X
i∈I
να
(1− l∗i )1−α
dl∗i = 0.
For all i ∈ I let
p = µtfLL, p1i =
να
(1− l∗i )1−α
, p2i = −µt
να(1− α)
(1− l∗i )2−α
.
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and
ai = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicc, bi = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uicl, ci = λi
µ
βi
β
¶t
uill + p2i.
With this notation the first order conditions can be written as follows:
aidc∗i + bidl
∗
i − dµt = 0, ∀i ∈ I (1)
bidc
∗
i + [ci + p]dl
∗
i + p
X
j∈I,j 6=i
dl∗j − (fL + p1i)dµt = µtfLkdk, ∀i ∈ I. (2)
X
i∈I
dc∗i +
X
i∈I
(fL + p1i)dl
∗
i = fkdk − dy. (3)
Assume for simplicity that I = {1, ..., q} where q = #I. We can alternatively
write these equations in a matrix form, AX = X0, where:
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 0 · · · 0 b1 0 · · · 0 −1
0
...
. . .
... 0
...
. . .
... −1
0 0 · · · aq 0 0 · · · bq −1
b1 0 · · · 0 c1 + p p · · · p −fL − p11
0
...
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · bq p p · · · cq + p −fL − p1q
1 1 · · · 1 fL + p11 · · · fL + p1q 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
X =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dc∗1
...
dc∗q
dl∗1
...
dl∗q
dµt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, X0 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
µtfkLdk
...
µtfkLdk
fkdk − dy
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
In particular,
A =
Ã
M −dT
d 0
!
,
where:
M =
Ã
M11 M12
M21 M22
!
, d = (1, ..., 1, fL + p11, ..., fL + p1q)
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and
M11 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 aq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , M12 =M21 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
b1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · bq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
M22 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 + p p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p p · · · cq + p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
We show that A is invertible. Let bA be the matrix obtained from A by changing
the sign of the last column, i.e
bA = Ã M dT
d 0
!
.
Observe that M22 = N1 +N2, where
N1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · cq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , N2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
p p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p p · · · p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Let z ={z1, ..., zq, ς1, ..., ςq) where z 6= 0. Since p2i < 0 and aici − b2i ≥ 0 (since
ui is concave), it follows that
zTMz = zT
Ã
M11 M12
M21 N1
!
z+ zT
Ã
0 0
0 N2
!
z
=
X
i∈I
"
ai
µ
zi +
bi
ai
ς i
¶2
+
aici − b2i
ai
ς2i
#
+ p
ÃX
i∈I
ςi
!2
< 0,
Therefore, M is negative definite. Let
B =
Ã
dT
0
!
.
Since M is negative definite on {z ∈ R2q+1 : Bz = 0}, (i.e zTMz < 0, ∀z ∈
R2q+1 with Bz = 0 and z 6= 0), it follows from Claim 2 that:
(−1)2q det
Ã
2qM2q 2qB
(2qB)T 0
!
= (−1)2q| bA| > 0 or | bA| > 0.
Since |A| = −| bA| < 0 the matrix A is invertible. By the Implicit Function
Theorem, ci(ν, ζt, k, y), li(ν, ζt, k, y) and µt(ν, ζ
t, k, y) are C1 in a neighborhood
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of (k, y) ∈ int eD. The Envelope Theorem then implies:
∂ eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y)
∂k
= µtfk(k,m−
X
i∈I
l∗i )
∂ eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y)
∂y
= −µt.
From equations (1),(2),(3) we obtain:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
µ
fL + p11 −
b1
a1
, .., fL + p1q −
bq
aq
¶
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
fL + p11 − b1a1
...
fL + p1q − bqaq
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+
qX
i=1
1
ai
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ dµt
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣−µtfLk
µ
fL + p11 −
b1
a1
, .., fL + p1q −
bq
aq
¶
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ fk
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ dk − dy,
with
V =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
c1 − b
2
1
a1
+ p · · · p
...
...
. . .
...
p · · · cq − b
2
q
aq
+ p
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Observe that the matrix V satisfies the hypothesis of Claim 1. Therefore, V −1
exists and
V −1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ <
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
...
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
From the first-order conditions we have:
fL + p1i =
uil(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )
uic(c
∗
i , l
∗
i )
, ∀i.
Given assumption U4 we also have:
fL + p1i −
bi
ai
=
uil
uic
− u
i
cl
uicc
=
uil
uicc
µ
uicc
uic
− u
i
cl
uil
¶
≥ 0.
It follows that:
∂µt
∂k
< 0,
and in particular
∂2 eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y)
∂k∂y
= −∂µt
∂k
> 0, ∀(k, y) ∈ int eD.
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iv) It follows from standard arguments.
v) For ν ∈ (0, 1] the claim follows from the Maximum Theorem. When
ν = 0, then eϕ = ϕ and Proposition 6 applies.
Equipped with the last results we return to the study of problems (Q) and
( bQ).
Proposition 8 Assume U1-U4 and F1-F4. Then,
i) The functions Vt and bV are supermodular in the interior of D, i.e for
(k, y), (k0, y0) ∈ intD we have:
Vt(λ, ζ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + Vt(λ, ζ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0))
≥ Vt(λ, ζ, k, y) + Vt(λ, ζ, k0, y0)
and
bV (λ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + bV (λ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0))
≥ bV (λ, k, y) + bV (λ, k0, y0).
ii) The policy function ϕ(0e, k) is non-decreasing in k. As a consequence,
the optimal capital path associated with problem bQ is monotonic. Moreover, if
k0 ≤ k00 and k∗,k0 are the optimal paths starting respectively from k0 and k00,
then k∗t ≤ k0t, ∀t.
Proof : i) Let (k, y) ∈ intD. Observe that for any ν ∈ [0, 1] we have 0 < y <ef (ν, k,m) . From Proposition 7, given (k, y), (k0, y0) ∈ intD, it follows that:
eVt(ν, λ, ζ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + eVt(ν, λ, ζ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0))
≥ eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k, y) + eVt(ν, λ, ζ, k0, y0).
Taking the limits of both sides as ν → 0 we get:
Vt(λ, ζ, (k, y) ∨ (k0, y0)) + Vt(λ, ζ, (k, y) ∧ (k0, y0))
≥ Vt(λ, ζ, k, y) + Vt(λ, ζ, k0, y0).
That is, Vt is supermodular on the interior of D. The supermodularity of bV
follows from the fact that Vt = bV in case where all agents have the same
discount factor, i.e βi = β, ∀i ∈ I.
ii) Recall that problem bQ is stationary. Assume that k0 < k00. If k0 = 0,
then ϕ(0e, k0) = 0 and ϕ(0e, k00) > 0. Let k0 > 0 and assume the contrary, i.e
ϕ(0e, k0) > ϕ(0e, k00). We consider two cases:
Case 1: Assume that ϕ(0e, k0) < f(k0,m).
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Observe that
0 < ϕ(0e, k00) < f(k0,m)
0 < ϕ(0e, k0) < f(k00,m).
That is, ϕ(0e, k00) is feasible from k0 and ϕ(0e, k0) is feasible from k00. Since bV is
supermodular in the interior of D, the claim follows from standard arguments
(see Majumdar et al. (2000), Ch. 2, Proposition 5.2).
Case 2: Assume that ϕ(0e, k0) = f(k0,m).
We have that 0 < ϕ(0e, k00) < f(k00,m). The continuity of ϕ implies that for
k < k00 with k suﬃciently close to k00 we have 0 < ϕ(0e, k) < f(k,m). Let
k1 ∈ [k0, k00) be the first element, such that, ϕ(0e, k1) = f(k1,m). For any
k ∈ (k1, k00], we have 0 < ϕ(0e, k) < f(k,m) and ϕ(0e, k) ≤ ϕ(0e, k00) (refer to Case
1). It follows that
ϕ(0e, k00) ≥ ϕ(0e, k1) = f(k1,m) ≥ f(k0,m) = ϕ(0e, k0).
We conclude the proof.
Lemma 4 Let k0 > 0. Under AssumptionsU1-U4, F1-F4, if k∗ is the optimal
path starting from k0, then k∗t > 0, ∀t.
Proof : See Appendix A.
To proceed further we need to impose some additional structure on prefer-
ences and production technology.
Assumption U5: For any period utility function ui that satisfies ui(c, 0) =
ui(0, l) = 0,∀c ≥ 0, l ≥ 0 we assume that uic(x, x) and uil(x, x) are non-
increasing in x
Remark 3 Assumption U5 is satisfied for the Cobb-Douglas class u(c, l) =
cαlβ, with α+ β ≤ 1, as well as, the CES class u(c, l) = [cα+ lα] 1α , with α < 0.
It is also satisfied by the class of period utilities u(c, l) = m[h(c, l)], where h is
a homogeneous function of degree 1 satisfying h(c, 0) = h(0, l) = 0 and m is a
monotone increasing and concave transformation with m(0) = 0.
Assumption F5: The production function F is homogeneous of degree α ∈
(0, 1], i.e F (k,L) = LαF
¡
k
L , 1
¢
.
Lemma 5 Let k0 > 0. Under AssumptionsU1-U5, F1-F5, if k∗ is the optimal
path starting from k0, then k∗t cannot converge to zero.
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Proof : See Appendix A.
The following result proves the existence of a unique non-trivial steady state
for the planner’s problem involving only the most patient consumers.
Proposition 9 Let k0 > 0 and k∗ denote the optimal solution from k0 to prob-
lem ( bQ). There exists a unique ks such that k∗t → ks.Moreover let (c∗i , l∗i )i∈I1 de-
note the individuals’ optimal intertemporal allocations associated with k∗. There
exists (ci, li)i∈I1such that c
∗
i,t → csi , l∗i,t → lsi , ∀i ∈ I1.
Proof : From Proposition 8(ii) we know that the optimal capital sequence k∗
is bounded and monotonic. In addition, Lemma 5 implies that k∗t → ks > 0.
By the principle of optimality, for any t, we have:
cW (k∗t ) = bV (λ, k∗t , k∗t+1) + βcW (k∗t+1).
Taking the limits as t→ +∞ we obtain:
cW (ks) = bV (λ, ks, ks) + βcW (ks).
It follows that ks is a steady state. From Proposition 1, there exists (csi , l
s
i )i∈I1
associated with ks that solves:
bV (λ, ks, ks) = max X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li)
s.t.
X
i∈I1
ci + ks ≤ f(ks,m−
X
i∈I1
li)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I1.
Observe that 0 < ks < f (ks,m) . Indeed, if ks = f (ks,m), then:X
i∈I1
csi = 0 and
X
i∈I1
lsi = 0.
This implies that bV (λ, ks, ks) = 0. Since cW (ks) > 0 for ks > 0 (see Proposition
4) and β ∈ (0, 1), we obtain a contradiction.
From Proposition 2 we have csi = ci(λ, 0e, ks, ks) > 0 and lsi = li(λ, 0e, ks, ks) >
0, ∀i ∈ I1. Moreover, since ci(λ, 0e, k∗t , k∗t+1) and li(λ, 0e, k∗t , k∗t+1) are continuous
functions and k∗t → ks, it follows that for any i ∈ I1:
ci(λ, 0e, k∗t , k∗t+1)→ ci(λ, 0e, ks, ks) and li(λ, 0e, k∗t , k∗t+1)→ lsi (λ, 0e, ks, ks).
The proof of uniqueness of steady state is given in Appendix B.
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Remark 4 We provide below an example of an economy having a steady state
in which some agent i does not provide labor, i.e an economy in which lsi = 1
for some agent i. The example illustrates in a clear way the possibility of corner
solutions in our model. In the example, one of the consumers strongly prefers
leisure. It is therefore optimal for the social planner to allocate to this consumer
the total endowment of his leisure time.
Example 1 Consider an economy with 2 agents having period utilities func-
tions of the following form: u1(c1, l1) = cα1 + l
α
1 and u
2(c2, l2) = cb2 + θl
b
2,
α, b ∈ (0, 1). Technology is Cobb-Douglas, F (k, L) = kγL1−γ , where γ ∈ (0, 1).
For simplicity assume that δ = 1 (full depreciation). Assume that β1 = β2 = β
(both consumers have the same discount factor, i.e I2 is an empty set) and
that the social planner puts equal weights to both consumers, λ1 = λ2 = 12 . To
simplify further, assume that α = b.
It is easy to check that the steady state of this economy is described by the
solution of the following system of equations:
cα−11 = c
α−1
2 (1)µ
c1
l1
¶1−α
= (1− γ)xγ + η1 (2)
θ
µ
c2
l2
¶1−α
= (1− γ)xγ + η2 (3)
x = (γβ)
1
1−γ (4)
k = x(2− l1 − l2) (5)
c1 + c2 − (2− l1 − l2)[xγ − x] = 0 (6)
The constant ηi denotes the multiplier associated with the constraint li ≤ 1.
From equations (1)-(4) it follows that
c1 = c2 = l1[(1− γ)xγ + η1]
1
1−α (7)
l2 =
∙
θl1−α1 [(1− γ)xγ + η1]
(1− γ)xγ + η2]
¸ 1
1−α
. (8)
One can show that the system of steady state equations (1)-(8) is consistent
with a solution ((csi , l
s
i )i=1,2, x
s, ks, ηs1, η
s
2) such that l
s
2 = 1. Indeed, assume that
((csi , l
s
i )i=1,2, x
s, ks, ηs1, η
s
2) is a solution such that l
s
2 = 1. Equation (4) gives the
value of xs. From equations (6)-(7) we have that
2ls1[(1− γ)(xs)γ + ηs1]
1
1−α = (1− ls1)[(xs)γ − xs]. (9)
For any ηs1 ≥ 0 equation (9) is satisfied for a unique ls1 ∈ (0, 1). In this case,
we have ηs1 = 0. From equation (8)
ls1[θ(1− γ)(xs)γ ]
1
1−α = (1− γ)(xs)γ + ηs2. (10)
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Let θ such that ls1[θ(1 − γ)xγ]
1
1−α = (1 − γ)xγ . For any θ > θ equation (10)
determines ηs2 > 0. Given l
s
1, equation (7) determines c
s
1 and c
s
2. Finally, k
s is
determined by equation (5).
We have the following result.
Lemma 6 Let a ∈ (0, k]. Then, for any ε > 0, there exists T (a, ε), such that,
for any k ≥ a, for any t ≥ T (a, ε) we have:¯¯¯¯
ϕt(0e, k)− ks
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Proof : Choose some a ∈ (0, k]. Let ε > 0 and k ≥ a. Given Proposition 9,
there exists T (k, ε) such that ,for any t ≥ T (k, ε), we have:¯¯¯¯
ϕt(0e, k)− ks
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Since ϕt(0e, k) is continuous, there exists a neighborhood N (k) of k, such that,
for any k0 ∈ N (k) we have: ¯¯¯¯
ϕT (k,ε)(0e, k0)− ks
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Assume that k < ks. Since (ϕt(0e, k)) is a non-decreasing sequence, it follows
that for any k0 ∈ N (k), for any t ≥ T (k, ε) we have:¯¯¯¯
ϕt(0e, k0)− ks
¯¯¯¯
= ks − ϕt(0e, k0)
≤ ks − ϕT (k,ε)(0e, k0)
< ε.
When k ≥ ks the argument is similar. Consider next a finite covering (N (kj))Jj=1
of [a, k] and let T (a, ε) = maxj∈{1,...,J}{T (kj , ε)}.
We now return to the initial problem involving all agents, i.e problem (Q).
The following Proposition shows that the optimal capital sequence is bounded
away from zero.
Proposition 10 For any k0 > 0 and k∗ optimal from k0, there exists γ > 0
such that k∗t ≥ γ, ∀t.
Proof : Lemma 4 implies that there exists a ∈ (0, ks) and a subsequence
(k∗Tn)n∈N such that k
∗
Tn ≥ a, ∀n ∈ N. Choose ε > 0 such that a − ε > 0
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and ks − 2ε > a. Let T (a, ε) be as in Lemma 6. It follows that for any n ∈ N
we have: ¯¯¯¯
ϕT (ε,a)(0e, k∗Tn)− ks
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
This in turn implies that
ϕT (ε,a)(0e, k∗Tn) > ks − ε > a− ε. (1)
Let t ∈ {1, ..., T (a, ε)}. The uniform continuity of ϕt implies that for n large
enough we have: ¯¯¯¯
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn)− ϕ
t(0e, k∗Tn)
¯¯¯¯
< ε
It follows that
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > ϕ
t(0e, k∗Tn)− ε. (2)
Since a ∈ (0, ks), we have that ϕt(0e, a) ≥ a, ∀t. Moreover, k∗Tn ≥ a implies that
ϕt(0e, k∗Tn) ≥ ϕt(0e, a) ≥ a, ∀t. Therefore, for any t ∈ {1, ..., T (a, ε)}, it follows
from (2) that:
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε.
In particular, for t = T (ε, a), the inequalities (1), (2) imply that:
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn , k∗Tn) > k
s − 2ε > a.
By definition:
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn , k∗Tn) = k
∗
Tn+T (a,ε) > a.
In a similar way, Lemma 6 implies that for any n ∈ N:¯¯¯¯
ϕT (a,ε)(0e, k∗Tn+T (a,ε))− ks
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Moreover, for any t ∈ {1, ..., T (a, ε)}, the uniform continuity of ϕt implies that:¯¯¯¯
ϕt(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε))− ϕ
t(0e, k∗Tn+T (a,ε))
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
It follows that for any t ∈ {1, ..., T (a, ε)} we have:
ϕt(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) > a− ε
and in particular
ϕT (a,ε)(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) > k
s − 2ε > a.
By definition, for any t ∈ {1, ..., T (a, ε)}, we have:
ϕt(ζTn+T (a,ε), k∗Tn+T (a,ε)) = k
∗
Tn+T (a,ε)+t.
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This in turn implies that:
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε, ∀t = 1, ..., 2T (a, ε).
Repeating the above argument one can establish that :
ϕt(ζTn , k∗Tn) > a− ε, ∀t = 1, ...,∞.
The claim is true for
γ = min{k∗1, ..., k∗Tn , a− ε}.
Proposition 11 Let k0 > 0 and ((c∗i , l
∗
i )i,k
∗) denote the solution to problem
(P ). Let ((csi , l
s
i )i∈I1 , k
s) denote the steady state associated with problem ( bQ).
Then, i) k∗t → ks, ii) c∗i,t → csi and l∗i,t → lsi , ∀i ∈ I1, iii) c∗i,t → 0 and l∗i,t → 0,
∀i ∈ I2.
Proof : Given the previous results, the proof of (i) parallels the one presented
in Le Van-Vailakis (2003, Proposition 4). Since k∗t → ks and (ks, ks) ∈ intD,
there exists some T such that (k∗t , k
∗
t+1) ∈ intD, ∀t ≥ T. We know that for
any i ∈ I, ci(λ, ζt, k∗t , k∗t+1) and li(λ, ζt, k∗t , k∗t+1) are continuous functions in
[0, 1]#I2 × intD and that V (λ, ζt, k∗t , k∗t+1) → bV (λ, ks, ks). This proves claims
(ii) and (iii).
Remark 5 The last Proposition shows that the equilibrium paths associated
with problem (P ) converge to a limit point. This limit point is the steady state
associated with the planner’s problem involving only the most patient consumers.
The model exhibits the well known property of "the emergence of a dominant
consumer" found in the seminal papers of Becker (1980) and Bewley (1982).
After all, one can ask if the convergence point is itself a steady state for the
problem involving all agents. It is easy to show that this is not true.
Assume that I2 6= ∅, i.e there exists some j ∈ I such that βj < β. Let ks be
the steady state associated with problem ( bQ). Let k0 = ks and assume that for
any t ≥ 1, (i) k∗t = ks, (ii) c∗i,t = csi , l∗i,t = lsi , ∀i ∈ I1, (iii) c∗i,t = 0, l∗i,t = 0,
∀i ∈ I2. Since 0 < ks < f(ks,m), from Proposition 2(iv) it follows that c∗j,t > 0,
l∗j,t > 0, ∀t ≥ 0. This in turn contradicts the optimality of k∗t = ks and c∗i,t = 0,
l∗i,t = 0, ∀i ∈ I2.
In this case, if the economy starts at k0 = ks any optimal path (k∗t ) converges
to ks with k∗1 6= ks. As a result, the optimal path may exhibit fluctuations at
least for the beginning periods.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 4: We prove the claim for the case where #I ≥ 23.
Let k0 > 0 but assume that k∗1 = 0. Recall that L
∗
t = m −
P
i∈I l
∗
i,t. Since
f(k0, L∗0) ≥ (1− δ)k0 > 0, there exists some i1 ∈ I such that c∗i1,0 > 0. Choose
ε > 0 such that c∗i1,0 > ε+ ε
2. The proof follows in two steps.
Step 1: We claim that 0 ≤ k∗2 < f(0,m).
Assume the contrary. In this case, c∗i,1 = 0 and l
∗
i,1 = 0, ∀i ∈ I. Let α = ε+1βi1
and γ = ε+1βi1 [c
∗
i1,0
−(ε+ε2)] . Consider the alternative path ((ci, li)i,k) defined as
follows:
i) ci1,0 = c
∗
i1,0 − (ε+ ε
2), ci2,0 = c
∗
i2,0 + ε
2, ci,0 = c∗i,0, ∀i ∈ I\{i1, i2}
ii) ci1,1 = αε, ci2,1 = ε, ci,1 = 0, ∀i ∈ I\{i1, i2}
iii) li,0 = l∗i,0, ∀i ∈ I, li1,1 = γε, li2,1 = ε, li,1 = 0, ∀i ∈ I\{i1, i2}
iv) ci,t = c∗i,t and li,t = l
∗
i,t, ∀i ∈ I,∀t ≥ 2
v) k1 = ε, kt = k∗t , ∀t ≥ 2.
Observe that
c∗i1,0 − (ε+ ε
2) + c∗i2,0 + ε
2 +
X
i∈I\{i1,i2}
c∗i,0 + ε = f(k0, L
∗
0).
Moreover,
f(k1,m− li1,1 − li2,1)− k2 − ci1,1 − ci2,1
= f(ε,m− γε− ε)− f(0,m)− αε− ε
≥ ε[fk(ε,m− γε− ε)− fL(ε,m− γε− ε)(1 + γ)− α− 1].
Due to the Inada conditions on F, the term inside the bracket is strictly positive
for ε small enough. This proves feasiblity of the alternative path.
Observe that as ε→ 0 both α and γ converge to a finite value. In addition,
α
γ = ci1,0. Define:
∆(ε) =
X
i∈I
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t)−
X
i∈I
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t)
= λi1 [u
i1(ci1,0, li1,0)− ui1(c∗i1,0, l
∗
i1,0)] + λi1βi1
£
ui1(ci1,1, li1,1)− ui1(c∗i1,1, l
∗
i1,1)
¤
+ λi2 [u
i2(ci2,0, li2,0)− ui2(c∗i2,0, l
∗
i2,0)] + λi2βi2
£
ui2(ci2,1, li2,1)− ui2(c∗i2,1, l
∗
i2,1)
¤
= ∆i1(ε) +∆i2(ε).
The concavity of ui1 implies that
∆i1(ε)
λi1
= βi1
£
ui1(ci1,1, li1,1)− ui1(c∗i1,1, l
∗
i1,1)
¤
+ [ui1(ci1,0, li1,0)− ui1(c∗i1,0, l
∗
i1,0)]
≥ βi1u
i1(αε, γε)− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2).
3 In case where there is only one agent the argument is similar.
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If ui1cl > 0, then
∆i1(ε)
λi1
≥ βi1u
i1
µ
γε
αε
γε
, γε
¶
− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
≥ βi1u
i1
µ
α
γ
, 1
¶
γε− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
≥ βi1u
i1
c
µ
α
γ
, 1
¶
αε− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
= βi1u
i1
c (ci1,0, 1)
ε2 + ε
βi1
− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
= (ε2 + ε)[ui1c (ci1,0, 1)− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)] ≥ 0.
If ui1cl ≤ 0, then
∆i1(ε)
λi1
≥ βi1u
i1(αε, γε)− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
≥ βi1u
i1
c (αε, γε)αε− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ε+ ε2)
≥ (ε2 + ε)[ui1c (αε, 1)− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)].
Due to the Inada conditions on ui1 , the term inside the bracket becomes non-
negative for ε small enough.
We also have:
∆i2(ε)
λi2
= βi2
£
ui2(ε, ε)− ui2(c∗i2,1, l
∗
i2,1)
¤
+ [ui2(ci2,0, li2,0)− ui2(c∗i2,0, l
∗
i2,0)]
≥ βi2u
i2(ε2, ε) + ui2c (ci2,0, li2,0)ε
2 ≥ 0.
Step 2: If F (0,m) = 0, then by feasiblity k∗2 = F (0,m) = 0. But this
contradicts our claim in Step 1. We conclude that k∗1 > 0. Consider next the
case where F (0,m) > 0. From Step 1 we know that 0 ≤ k∗2 < f(0,m), so from
Proposition 2(iv) it follows that c∗i1,1 > 0 and l
∗
i1,1 > 0. Observe that L
∗
1 > 0 (if
L∗1 = 0 then by feasibility c
∗
i1,1 = 0 : a contradiction). Consider the alternative
feasible path ((ci, li)i,k) defined as follows:
i) ci1,0 = c
∗
i1,0 − ε, ci1,1 = c
∗
i1,1 + f(ε, L
∗
1)− f(0, L∗1), ci1,t = c∗i1,t, ∀t ≥ 2,
ii) ci,t = c∗i,t ∀i 6= i1,∀t and li,t = l∗i,t, ∀i,∀t
iii) k1 = ε, kt = k∗t , ∀t ≥ 2.
Define:
∆ε =
X
i∈I
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(ci,t, li,t)−
X
i∈I
λi
∞X
t=0
βtiu
i(c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t).
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The concavity of ui1 and f implies that
∆i1(ε)
λi1
= ui1 (ci1,0, li1,0)− ui1 (c∗i1,0, l
∗
i1,0) + βi1
£
ui1 (ci1,1, li1,1)− ui1(c∗i1,1, l
∗
i1,1)
¤
≥ ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)(ci1,0 − c∗i1,0) + βi1u
i1
c (ci1,1, li1,1)[f(ε, L
∗
1)− f(0, L∗1)]
≥ −ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)ε+ βi1u
i1
c (ci1,1, li1,1)fk(ε, L
∗
1)ε
≥ ε
h
β
i1
ui1c (ci1,1, li1,1)fk(ε, L
∗
1)− ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)
i
.
As ε→ 0, ui1c (ci1,1, li1,1)fk(ε, L∗1)→ +∞ while ui1c (ci1,0, li1,0)→ u
i1
c (c∗i1,0, l
∗
i1,0) <
+∞. Hence, for ε > 0 small enough, ∆i1(ε) > 0 : a contradiction. It follows
that k∗1 > 0. Working by induction we can show that k
∗
t > 0 for any t.
Proof of Lemma 5: Assume the contrary: k0 > 0, k∗ is optimal from k0 and
k∗t → 0. Since fk(0, 1) > 1, for k small enough, we have that f(k,m) > k. This
implies that there exists a date T, such that, 0 < k∗t+1 < f(k
∗
t ,m), ∀t ≥ T. We
know that with any optimal solution k∗ of problem (Q), there exist associated
sequences (c∗i , l
∗
i )i∈I for consumption and leisure, such that, ((c
∗
i , l
∗
i )i∈I ,k
∗) is
a solution to problem (P ). Recall that L∗t = m−
P
i∈I l
∗
i,t. The proof follows in
two steps:
Step 1: We claim that the sequence
³
k∗t
L∗t
´
converges to zero.
Let
³
k∗tn
L∗tn
´
be a subsequence such that:
lim sup
t
k∗t
L∗t
= lim
n
k∗tn
L∗tn
.
Without loss of generality (tn) can be chosen such that 0 < k∗tn+1 < f(k
∗
tn ,m)
for any n ∈ N and l∗i,tn → li ∈ [0, 1] for any i ∈ I. Moreover, assume that
#I = m (if #I < m the claim follows directly). If li < 1 for some i, it follows
that L∗tn → L > 0 and the claim is true. Consider next the case where li = 1
for all i ∈ I. In this case, L∗tn → 0. The first order conditions for problem (P )
imply that for any i ∈ I, for any n ∈ N :
FL
¡
k∗tn , L
∗
tn
¢
≤
uil(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
uic(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
.
Define ξ (x) = F (x, 1)− xFk (x, 1) . Since f is homogeneous of degree α ∈ (0, 1]
we have:
FL(k
∗
tn , L
∗
tn) = α(L
∗
tn)
α−1ξ
µ
k∗tn
L∗tn
¶
(1)
≤
uil(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
uic(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
.
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Denote B(k0) := f(A(k0),m). Since l∗i,tn → 1 there must exist some ε ∈ (0, 1)
and N ∈ N such that 1− ε ≤ l∗tn , ∀n ≥ N. It follows that ∀n ≥ N
uil(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
uic(c
∗
i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
≤
ui(c∗i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
(1− ε)uic(c∗i,tn , l
∗
i,tn)
(2)
≤
⎧
⎨
⎩
ui(B(k0),1)
(1−ε)uic(B(k0),1−ε)
, if ui12 > 0
ui(B(k0),1)
(1−ε)uic(B(k0),1)
, if ui12 ≤ 0
Consider first the case where α ∈ (0, 1). Combining (1) and (2) we get:
lim
n
α(L∗tn)
α−1ξ
µ
k∗tn
L∗tn
¶
≤M0.
For this to be true we must have:
ξ
µ
lim
n
k∗tn
L∗tn
¶
= 0.
Observe that ξ is strictly increasing on R++. From the definition of ξ and the
concavity of F we also have that ξ (z) = F (z, 1)− zFk (z, 1) ≥ 0 for any z > 0.
It follows that
k∗tn
L∗tn
→ 0.
Consider next the case where α = 1. Assume that
k∗tn
L∗tn
→ z > 0. Since
f(k∗t , L
∗
t ) = k
∗
t f(1,
L∗t
k∗t
) and k∗t → 0, by feasibility it follows that c∗i,t → 0 for any
i. Then combining (1) and (2) and using the Inada conditions on ui we arrive
at a contradiction. We subsequently conclude that
k∗tn
L∗tn
→ 0.
Step 2: Choose some ε > 0, such that, fk(ε, 1) > 1. Since
k∗t
L∗t
→ 0, there
exists some date T
0
, such that k
∗
t
L∗t
≤ ε, ∀t ≥ T 0 .
For any t ≥ T1 = max{T, T 0} Euler’s equations hold, i.e for any i ∈ I, we
have:
uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) = βiu
i
c(c
∗
i,t+1, l
∗
i,t+1)fk
¡
k∗t+1, L
∗
t+1
¢
It is easy to check that fk
¡
k∗t+1, L
∗
t+1
¢
≥ fk (ε, 1) , ∀t ≥ T1. Indeed, if L∗t+1 ≥ 1
the inequality is true since fkL ≥ 0. If L∗t+1 < 1 observe that:
fk
¡
k∗t+1, L
∗
t+1
¢
= (L∗t+1)
α−1Fk
µ
k∗t+1
L∗t+1
, 1
¶
+ (1− δ)
≥ Fk
µ
k∗t+1
L∗t+1
, 1
¶
+ (1− δ)
≥ fk (ε, 1) .
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It follows that there exists T2 ≥ T1 such that for any t ≥ T2 :
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)
t−T2Y
τ=1
∙µ
min
i
βi
¶
fk
¡
k∗t+τ , L
∗
t+τ
¢¸
≥ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)
t−T2Y
τ=1
∙µ
min
i
βi
¶
fk (ε, 1)
¸
≥ At−T2uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t),
with A = (mini βi) fk (ε, 1) > 1. Fix some i ∈ I. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Assume that uicl ≤ 0.
In this case, ∀t > T2 we have:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ At−T2uic(B(k0), 1).
Since At−T2 → +∞ as t→ +∞, we obtain a contradiction.
Case 2: Assume that uicl > 0.
In this case, ∀t > T2 we have:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t).
SinceAt−T2 → +∞ as t→ +∞, it follows that uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)→ 0. But uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t) ≥
uic(B(k0), l
∗
i,t) in which case l
∗
i,t → 0. Observe also that ∀t > T2 we have:
uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) = u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)fL(k
∗
t , L
∗
t )
≤ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)f
µ
k∗t
L∗t
, 1
¶
≤ uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t)f (ε, 1) .
It follows that uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)→ 0 and therefore c∗i,t → 0.
By assumption ui(0, 0) = 0. We have to distinguish three subcases.
i) Assume first that there exists c > 0 such that ui(c, 0) > 0.
In this case, there exists bc > 0 such that uic(bc, 0) > 0 (if not, it follows that
uic(c, 0) = 0, ∀c > 0 : a contradiction). Since c∗i,t → 0, T2 can be chosen such
that, for any t > T2, we have c∗i,t < bc. In this case:
+∞ > uic(c∗i,T2 , l
∗
i,T2) ≥ A
t−T2uic(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ At−T2uic(bc, 0).
Since At−T2 → +∞ as t→ +∞, we obtain a contradiction.
ii) Consider next the case where there exists l > 0 such that ui(0, l) > 0.
A similar argument implies that there exists bl such that uil(0,bl) > 0. Since
l∗i,t → 0, T2 can be chosen such that, for any t > T2, we have l∗i,t < bl. In this
case:
+∞ > uil(c∗i,t, l∗i,t) ≥ uil(0,bl) > 0.
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Since uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)→ 0 as t→ +∞, we obtain a contradiction.
iii) Consider finally the case where ui(c, 0) = ui(0, l) = 0.
We know that c∗i,t → 0 and l∗i,t → 0. Observe that for any subsequence (c∗i,t, l∗i,t)
such that c∗i,t ≤ l∗i,t, Assumption U5 implies that uic(c∗i,t, l∗i,t) ≥ uic(l∗i,t, l∗i,t) ≥
uic(1, 1) > 0 : a contradiction since we know that u
i
c(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) → 0. In a similar
way, for any subsequence (c∗i,t, l
∗
i,t)t such that c
∗
i,t > l
∗
i,t, Assumption U5 implies
that uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t) ≥ uil(c∗i,t, c∗i,t) ≥ uil(B(k0), B(k0)) > 0 : a contradiction since we
know that uil(c
∗
i,t, l
∗
i,t)→ 0.
Appendix B: Uniqueness of steady state
Given any ν ∈ (0, 1] denote:
ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I1) := f(k,m−X
i∈I1
li) + ν
X
i∈I1
(1− li)α + ν(m−#I1).
Let 0e = (0)i∈I2 denote the zero vector in R#I2 . Observe thatbV (ν, λ, k, y) := eV (ν, λ, 0e, k, y)
= max
X
i∈I1
λiui(ci, li) (bS(ν))
s.t.
X
i∈I1
ci + y ≤ ef (ν, k, (1− li)i∈I1)
ci ≥ 0, li ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ I1
is the indirect utility function associated with the Pareto optimal problem in-
volving only the most patient consumers in an economy with production possi-
bilities described by the function ef(ν, k, (1 − li)i∈I1). The corresponding value
function is as follows:
cW (ν, k0) := fW (ν, 0e, k0)
= max
∞X
t=0
βt bV (ν, λ, kt, kt+1) ( bQ(ν))
s.t. 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ ef (ν, kt,m) , ∀t
k0 ≥ 0, is given.
The optimal policy function for this problem is given by:
eϕ(ν, 0e, k) = argmaxnbV (ν, λ, k, y) + βcW (ν, y) : 0 ≤ y ≤ ef (ν, k,m)o .
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Let k0 > 0 and k∗(ν) be the optimal solution from k0 to problem bQ(ν). In this
case, we write k∗t+1(ν) = eϕ(ν, 0e, k∗t (ν)) = eϕt(ν, 0e, k0). The argument of the proof
is as follows. We first show that given any ν ∈ (0, 1] the problem bQ(ν) has a
unique steady state denoted ks(ν).We subsequently prove that ks(ν) converges
to some ks as ν → 0. The last step involves to show that, independent of the
initial capital stock k0, the optimal path associated with problem bQ converges
to ks. Working in this direction we need the following two results:
Claim 1 Fix some ν ∈ (0, 1]. Let k0 > 0 and k∗(ν) be a solution from k0 to
problem bQ(ν). Then, (k∗t (ν)) converges monotonically to a unique steady state.
Proof : Fix some ν ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to check that efν, k, (1− li)i∈I1) satisfies
the assumptions F1-F5. Proposition 8 shows that bV (ν, λ, k, y) is supermodular
in the interior of eD(ν). This implies that (k∗t (ν)) is monotonic. The method
of proof in Lemma 4 and 5 can apply to show that (k∗t (ν)) is strictly positive
and does not converge to zero. It then follows that (k∗t (ν)) converges to some
ks(ν) > 0. We next show that ks(ν) is in addition unique.
Assume that there are more than one nontrivial steady states. Their number
must be finite4. The roots of the Jacobian evaluated at any steady state will
be the solution of:
βλ2bV12 + [bV22 + β bV11]λ+ bV12 = 0.
A suﬃcient condition for saddle point stability5 is:
−(1 + β)bV12 + β bV11 + bV22 < 0.
We know that bV12 > 0. Since bV is concave, we also have that bV11, bV22 ≤ 0. Since
the number of steady states is finite one can find ks(ν), k
s
(ν), with ks(ν) <
k
s
(ν), such that, no point k ∈ (ks(ν), ks(ν)) is a steady state. Saddle point
stability implies that there exists ε > 0, such that, for any k0 ∈ (ks(ν) −
ε, ks(ν) + ε), eϕt(ν, 0e, k0) → ks(ν). Similarly, there must exist ε, such that, for
any k0 ∈ (k
s
(ν) − ε, ks(ν) + ε), eϕt(ν, 0e, k0) → ks(ν). Let k = supε(ks(ν) + ε)
and k = infε(k
s
(ν)− ε). Monotonicity implies that
ks(ν) < k = k = k < k
s
(ν).
For any k
s
(ν) > k
0
> k, we have eϕ(ν, 0e, k0) > k0 . The continuity of eϕ implies thateϕ(ν, 0e, k) ≥ k. In a similar way, for any ks(ν) < k0 < k, we have eϕ(ν, 0e, k0) < k0 ,
4Assume that the set of nontrivial steady states is infinite. Since this set is compact, there
will be a subsequence (ksn(ν)) that converges to some k
s(ν). But this leads to a contradiction,
since by the Implicit Function Theorem, for ks(ν) there is an open neighborhood U(ks(ν))
where ks(ν) is the unique solution to the steady state Euler equations.
5Refer to Majumdar et al. (2000) Ch. 2, Section 7.2.
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and by continuity, eϕ(ν, 0e, k) ≤ k. But this implies that k is a steady state: a
contradiction. Hence, ks(ν) is uniquely determined.
Claim 2 Let k0 > 0. For any ε > 0, there exists T (ε) such that for any
ν ∈ (0, 1], for any t ≥ T (ε) we have:¯¯¯¯eϕt(ν, 0e, k0)− ks(ν)
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Proof : We know that eϕt(ν, 0e, k0) → ks(ν). This implies that for any ε > 0,
there exists T (ν, ε) such that:¯¯¯¯eϕT (ν,ε)(ν, 0e, k0)− ks(ν)
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
The continuity of eϕ implies that there exists a neighborhood N (ν) of ν, such
that, for any ν0 ∈ N (ν) we have:¯¯¯¯eϕT (ν0,ε)(ν 0, 0e, k0)− ks(ν0)
¯¯¯¯
< ε.
Take a finite covering (N (νj))Jj=1 of [0, 1] and let T (ε) = maxj∈{1,...,J}{T (νj , ε)}.
Fix some k0 > 0. Let (νn) be a sequence such that νn → 0. Consider the
sequence of optimal paths (k∗(νn)) associated to the sequence of intertemporal
problems (Q(νn)) having an initial capital stock equal to k0. Assume that k0 ≤
ks(νn) for any n ∈ N. Recall that k∗t (νn) = eϕt(νn, 0e, k0) and k∗t = ϕt(0e, k0). We
have:
k0 ≤ eϕ(νn, 0e, k0) ≤ .... ≤ eϕt(νn, 0e, k0) ≤ ... ≤ ks(νn).
Denote ke := lim infn ks(νn). The continuity of eϕt(ν, 0e, k0) with respect to ν
implies that eϕt(νn, 0e, k0)→ ϕt(0e, k∗0) as νn → 0. We have:
k0 ≤ ϕ(0e, k∗0) ≤ .... ≤ ϕt(0e, k∗0) ≤ ... ≤ ke.
Assume that k∗t → k < ke. In this case there exists some N and an ε > 0 such
that k + ε < ks(νn) for any n ≥ N. From Claim 2, it follows that there exists
some T (ε) independent of (νn)n≥N such that
k + ε < k∗T (ε)(νn) < k
s(νn).
Letting νn → 0 we get
k + ε < k∗T (ε) ≤ k∗T (ε)+1 ≤ ... ≤ k,
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which is obviously a contradiction. It follows that k∗t → ke . A similar argu-
ment can apply to show that k∗t → ek where ek := lim supn ks(νn). As a re-
sult limνn→0 k
s(νn) exists. Denote this limit by ks. The same is true if we
had assumed alternatively that k0 ≥ ks(νn) for any n ∈ N. In either case
limνn→0 k
s(νn) = ks and k∗t → ks. We have proved that for any k0 > 0 the
optimal path (k∗t ) converges to k
s which is independent of k0. The proof is
complete.
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